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Message Text

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PASS TO DOE

E.O.11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY MEETING MARCH 3:
SOVIET STATEMENT
CTB MESSAGE NO. 161 ATEMENT
FOLLOWING IS DELEGATION'S TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT
DELIVERED BY HEAD OF SOVIET DELEGATION AT SUBJECT PLENARY
MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT: TODAY IN OUR STATEMENT WE WILL ADDRESS THE
ISSUE OF SO-CALLED INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS.

AS IT IS KNOWN, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS STATED THAT
OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US PROPOSAL ON INTERNAL SEISMIC
STATIONS WILL BE DETERMINED DEPENDING ON THE DEGREE TO
WHICH IT IS JUSTIFIED IN RELATION TO THE TREATY BEING
NEGOTIATED, AND ALSO DEPENDING ON THE CONFIDENCE WE
RECEIVE THAT SUCH STATIONS WILL NOT COMPLICATE VERIFI-
CATION PROCEDURES AND WILL NOT AFFECT THE SECURITY
INTERESTS OF OUR STATE.
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FIRST OF ALL, WE WOULD LIKE TO SET DOWN ONCE AGAIN A
GENERAL APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THE VERIFICATION
PROBLEM; A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE DELEGATIONS WAS
REACHED IN REGARD TO THIS AT PRACTICALLY THE VERY
BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS APPROACH IS THAT THE
BASIS FOR VERIFICATION SHOULD BE COMPRISED BY NATIONAL

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TECHNICAL MEANS SUPPLEMENTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. ALONG WITH THIS, ADDITIONAL OR AUXILIARY VERIFICATION PROCEDURES MAY BE DEVELOPED, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO ENHANCE CONFIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE BY ITS PARTIES. THIS IS THE SAME BASIS ON WHICH VERIFICATION ISSUES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, AND IT IS PRECISELY ON THIS BASIS THAT WE EXPRESSED OUR READINESS TO DISCUSS CERTAIN ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES.

IN OCTOBER OF LAST YEAR THE US DELEGATION MADE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT AUTOMATED SEISMIC STATIONS (SUCH WAS THE TERM USED THEN) WERE PROPOSED AS AN ADDITIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, THE BASIC PURPOSE OF WHICH WOULD BE TO INTRODUCE A CERTAIN ELEMENT OF TRUST AND TO ENHANCE IN THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC AND POLITICAL CIRCLES CONFIDENCE IN THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM PROVIDED BY THE TREATY. WE WERE BEING TOLD THAT AUTOMATED SEISMIC STATIONS WOULD PLAY THE ROLE OF A POLITICAL FACTOR, AND NOT OF THE BASIC MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

AND, WHEN AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTOR WARNKE STATED THAT THE US "HAS MADE CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT" THE CONCERN OF THE SOVIET UNION WITH REGARD TO, AS HE PUT IT, "THE OLD IDEA OF 'BLACK BOXES'", WE HAD HOPES OF ACHIEVING A
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MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM.

IN HIS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 1, DIRECTOR WARNKE INDICATED THAT "THE NEW REVISED APPROACH" OF THE US "IS DESIGNED SO AS NOT TO INTRUDE ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PARTICIPANTS; IT IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE INSTALLATIONS WILL NOT BE MISUSED FOR UNAUTHORIZED PURPOSES". THE SEISMIC STATIONS "WOULD BE NATIONALLY OUNED AND OPERATED".

WE HAVE FURTHER NOTED THAT IN THE GENERAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE PROPOSAL ON INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS, THE US SPECIALISTS HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE BASIC ROLE IN VERIFICATION OF TREATY COMPLIANCE WOULD BE PLAYED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. WE WERE ALSO TOLD THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THESE STATIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO SUPPLEMENTING NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND THUS WOULD ENHANCE CONFIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE. THEIR USE WOULD HELP TO ALLAY DOUBTS RELATED TO MANY AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENTS RECORDED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

THUS, AS WE UNDERSTAND THE CLARIFICATIONS PRESENTED, IN

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THE VIEW OF THE US THE OBJECTIVE OF INTERNAL STATIONS WOULD BE TO SIMPLIFY VERIFICATION OF TREATY COMPLIANCE, TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF SEISMIC EVENTS REMAINING AMBIGUOUS, AND TO INCREASE THE RELIABILITY OF VERIFICATION IMPLEMENT-ED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. IN THESE CLARIFICATIONS WE SAW THE POSSIBILITY OF A REASONABLE APPROACH, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH WE COULD ATTEMPT TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

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HOWEVER, THE ANALYSIS OF THE MATERIAL PRESENTED BY THE US DELEGATION ON THE SUBJECT OF INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS SHOWS THAT WE ARE NOW BEING OFFERED SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT WAS PROMISED. WE HAVE COME TO THE QUITE DEFINITE CONCLUSION THAT WHAT IS BEING TALKED ABOUT IS NOT AGREEING ON CERTAIN ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES SIMPLIFYING VERIFICATION AND ENHANCING CONFIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE, BUT ABOUT CREATING A NEW BROAD AUTOMATED SYSTEM CONSTITUTING THE BASIC VERIFICATION SYSTEM, THE EXISTENCE OF WHICH WOULD TURN NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS FROM BASIC INTO SUPPLE-MENTARY MEANS OF VERIFICATION. THIS CONCLUSION OF OURS WAS ACTUALLY CONFIRMED BY THE STATEMENT OF DIRECTOR WARNKE OF FEBRUARY 27, WHEN HE SAID THAT INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS SHOULD BE "AN INTEGRAL AND BASIC" PART OF THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM.

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LET US CONSIDER SOME SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE US PROPOSAL ON INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS.

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1. THE US PROPOSAL PROVIDES FOR AGREEING UPON CERTAIN PROCEDURES AND EQUIPMENT FOR REMOTE AUTOMATIC MONITORING AND OPERATING THE WORK OF THE STATIONS FROM THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE. THE ANALYSIS OF THE MATERIAL PRESENTED PROVIDES GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING THAT THE INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS IN THIS RESPECT DIFFER BUT LITTLE FROM AUTOMATED SEISMIC STATIONS, THAT IS, THE "BLACK BOXES" OF WHICH WE SPOKE IN THE PAST. THE NAME HAS CHANGED, BUT THE SUBSTANCE REMAINS THE SAME. THESE WILL NOT BE NATIONAL STATIONS UNDER THE CONTROL OF NATIONAL PERSONNEL, BUT ACTUALLY SUPRA-NATIONAL STATIONS.

2. THE US PROPOSES DEVELOPING SITE SELECTION PROCEDURES FOR INSTALLING INTERNAL STATIONS. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROCEDURES SHOWS THAT THEY CREATE BROAD POSSIBILITIES FOR SPECIALISTS OF ONE STATE TO TRAVEL AROUND THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE WITH VARIOUS TYPES OF EQUIPMENT, IN SEARCH OF APPROPRIATE SITES FOR INSTALLING STATIONS.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ONE CANDID REMARK. HERE WE HAVE REPRESENTED SOVEREIGN AND HIGHLY DEVELOPED STATES WHICH HAVE TREMENDOUS EXPERIENCE IN DEVELOPING SEISMIC AND OTHER NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION.
IN OUR COUNTRIES WE HAVE BROAD NETWORKS OF SEISMIC STATIONS WHICH COPE FULLY WITH THEIR DESIGNATED FUNCTIONS.

AS IS KNOWN, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY STATED IN THE AD HOC GROUP OF SEISMIC EXPERTS OF THE CCD ITS WILLINGNESS TO DESIGNATE A NUMBER OF SOVIET SEISMIC STATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL NETWORK. IN THE COURSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO DESIG-

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NATE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL STATIONS FOR THE PURPOSES OF VERIFYING TREATY COMPLIANCE. I THINK GENTLEMEN, THAT UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS THERE IS NO NECESSITY FOR US TO PROVIDE, SO TO SPEAK, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO EACH OTHER IN SELECTING SITES FOR INSTALLATION OF SEISMIC STATIONS. THAT IS WHY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE US PROPOSAL

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ON THE PROCEDURE FOR SITE SELECTION, THE LEGITIMATE QUESTION ARISES: WHAT REAL PURPOSE DOES IT SERVE?

3. WHEN PRESENTING "THE NEW REVISED APPROACH" OF THE US TO THE ISSUES OF VERIFICATION AT THE MEETING FEBRUARY 1, DIRECTOR WARNKE SPOKE IN FAVOR OF DEVELOPING "THE NECESSARY FORMS OF INTERACTION" BETWEEN THE PARTICIPANTS "ON A COOPERATIVE RATHER THAN CONFRONTATIONAL BASIS". HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS "WOULD FUNCTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CERTAIN AGREED PROCEDURES INTENDED TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE DATA". WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO THAT.

HOWEVER, AN EXAMINATION OF THE MATERIAL PRESENTED BY THE US SPECIALISTS ON THE ISSUE OF THE SO-CALLED JOINT PARTICIPATION OF THE OTHER SIDE'S PERSONNEL IN THE TESTING AND MAINTENANCE WORK AT THE INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS SHOWS THAT WE ARE SPEAKING HERE NOT OF COOPERATION, BUT OF DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE OTHER COUNTRY. IN ACTUALITY AN OPPORTUNITY IS BEING PROVIDED TO VISIT STATIONS AT ANY TIME AND FOR LENGTHY PERIODS, WHILE THE PURPOSES OF THE VISITS ARE IN MANY RESPECTS NOT CLEAR AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF VERIFICATION IS QUITE DUBIOUS.

4. THE US SPECIALISTS HAVE PRESENTED A LARGE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL PERTAINING TO THE TECHNICAL PARAMETERS OF INTERNAL

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SEISMIC STATIONS.

OUR EXPERTS ALSO WISH TO SHARE WITH THEIR AMERICAN AND ENGLISH COLLEAGUES OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS FIELD OF SCIENCE. HOWEVER, SHOULD WE TAKE THIS PATH, THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT TURN INTO AN INTERESTING AND USEFUL SYMPOSIUM FOR SPECIALISTS,BUT DIRECTOR WARNKE, MR. EDMONDS, AND I WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE ABLE TO LEAVE FOR HOME AND STAY THERE FOR A LONG TIME.

SUCH TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ARE OBVIOUSLY USEFUL, BUT NOT IN THIS FORUM. OUR TASK IS TO DEVELOP A TREATY ON THE COMPLETE BAN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS AND A PROTOCOL THERETO ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. WE SHOULD PROVIDE FOR AN APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION SYSTEM AS IT APPLIES TO THIS TASK ASSIGNED TO OUR THREE DELEGATIONS BY OUR GOVERN-MENTS. IF WE ARE TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THIS PRACTI-CAL TASK AND BE GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO WORK OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE TEXT OF THE TREATY -- AN EFFECTIVE TREATY, WHICH SHOULD BE VERIFIED FROM THE MOMENT OF ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE -- WE SHOULD ABOVE ALL RELY ON THAT WHICH
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ALREADY EXISTS. AND OUR COUNTRIES, AS WE KNOW, HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING SEISMIC MEANS.

5. THE ANALYSIS OF THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PARAMETERS PRESENTED IN THE WORKING GROUP FOR THE INTERNAL SEISMIC STATION DESIGN PROPOSED BY THE US SHOWS THAT THEY ARE CLEARLY EXCESSIVE. WITH SUCH CHARACTERISTICS IT BECOMES POSSIBLE TO RECORD ANY EVENTS TAKING PLACE ON THE TERRITORY OF A STATE, INCLUDING THOSE EVENTS WHICH HAVE NO RELATION WHATEVER TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY BEING DEVELOPED.

IF WE ARE TO CONSIDER THE IDEA OF INTERNAL STATIONS, WE SHOULD DO SO ONLY WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY COULD FACILITATE THE CLARIFICATION OF AMBIGUITIES WHICH MIGHT ARISE AS A RESULT OF RECORDING SEISMIC EVENTS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THE INTERNAL STATIONS MIGHT MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL DATA ON THESE EVENTS FOR IDENTIFYING THEM.

6. THE US DELEGATION PROPOSES USING THE SPACE COM-MUNICATIONS SYSTEM INTELSAT FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF SEISMIC DATA. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT INTERNAL STATIONS CAN ONLY BE CONSIDERED AN ADDITIONAL ELEMENT OF VERIFICATION, THERE IS NO NECESSITY FOR USING THE SPACE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. ONE CANNOT OMIT YET ANOTHER

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CIRCUMSTANCE, NAMELY THAT THE USE OF SPACE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS FOR DATA TRANSMISSION UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS IS CONNECTED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF INFRINGING UPON THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF OUR STATE.

BOTH YOU AND WE HAVE OUR OWN CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION
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AND OUR OWN CAPABILITIES FOR PROVIDING SEISMIC DATA TRANS-MISSION. THE TRANSMISSION OF SEISMIC INFORMATION, OF COURSE, WITH ACCOUNT GIVEN TO THE AGREED REQUIREMENTS AS TO ITS RELIABILITY, IS A MATTER FOR THE COUNTRY ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE SEISMIC STATIONS ARE LOCATED.

7. THE EXAMINATION OF THE WORKING MATERIAL PRESENTED BY THE AMERICAN SPECIALISTS ON THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO INTERNAL STATIONS, PROVIDES GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING THAT THERE IS AN ATTEMPT TO GET US INVOLVED IN DISCUSSING AND AGREEING UPON TECHNICAL DETAILS WHICH, IN OUR OPINION, SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE THE CONTENT OF THE TREATY. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS PROPOSED TO AGREE UPON SUCH DETAILS AS THE DEPTH AND DIAMETER OF BOREHOLES FOR THE INSTALLATION OF SEISMIC EQUIPMENT, THE DESIGN AND EVEN THE COLOR OF THE AUTHENTICATION UNIT, AND A WHOLE NUMBER OF OTHER DETAILS WHICH HAVE NO DIRECT BEARING ON THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

SUMMARIZING WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, THE SOVIET DELEGATION CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO STATE THE FOLLOWING. THE PRO-POSAL ON INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS AS PRESENTED IN THE MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO US, CLEARLY CONTRADICTS OUR AGREED MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ARE THE BASIS FOR VERIFICATION OF TREATY COMPLIANCE. THE STATIONS PROPOSED BY THE US, BOTH IN SUBSTANCE AS WELL AS IN FORM,ARE MEANT TO BE THE BASIC, AND NOT THE ADDITIONAL, MEANS OF VERIFICATION. THE PROCEDURES FOR INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERNAL STATIONS IN REALITY DEPRIVE THEM OF THEIR NATIONAL CHARACTER AND TURN THEM INTO SUPRA-NATIONAL STATIONS. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE STATIONS PERMIT ONE TO RECEIVE INFORMATION WHICH GOES FAR BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF WHAT IS REQUIRED BY THE TREATY. INSTEAD OF SIMPLIFYING VERIFICATION AND INCREASING ITS RELIABILITY AND THUS THE VIABILITY OF THE WHOLE TREATY, THE PROPOSED SYSTEM OF INTERNAL STATIONS COMPLICATES VERIFI-
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CATION EXTREMELY, AND LEADS NOT TO ENHANCEMENT OF CON-
FIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF
TRUST AMONG US, BUT ON THE CONTRARY BEARS THE DANGER OF
CONFRONTATIONS IN THE COURSE OF THE TREATY'S FUNCTIONING.

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PASS TO DOE

THE ENTIRE GAMUT OF THE PROPOSED TECHNICAL, ORGANIZATIONAL,
AND PROCEDURAL MEASURES CONNECTED WITH SO-CALLED INTERNAL
STATIONS, TESTIFIES TO THE FACT THAT THE OLD IDEA OF
BLACK BOXES" HAS NOW ACQUIRED A NEW FORM AND CONTENT. THE
PROPOSED SYSTEM OF OPERATING INTERNAL STATIONS LEADS TO
THE VIOLATION OF OUR COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGNTY AND MAY AFFECT
THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION. FOR
THESE REASONS THE SOVIET DELEGATION STATES THAT THE SYSTEM
OF INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS PROPOSED BY THE US IS
UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

ALL OF THIS LEADS US TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ONLY
CORRECT SOLUTION WHICH MEETS THE OBJECTIVES OF DEVELOPING
AN EFFECTIVE TREATY ON THE COMPLETE BAN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TESTS IS A SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION BASED ON THE USE OF
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND SUPPLEMENTED BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA FROM A GLOBAL NETWORK
OF SEISMIC STATIONS.

AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE PREPARED, BY WAY OF TAKING A
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STEP TOWARD MEETING OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS HALFWAY, TO AGREE ON CERTAIN AUXILIARY VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT.

THE FOLLOWING COULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS TO US FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT MIGHT PROVIDE THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCHANGING SEISMIC DATA AMONG ITS PARTIES, THE SIDES SHALL AGREE TO INSTALL AT THOSE NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS WHICH ARE DESIGNATED FOR THE GLOBAL NETWORK, EQUIPMENT ACCORDING TO AGREED TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS. THEY SHALL AGREE TO USE AT THESE STATIONS A TECHNICAL MONITORING DEVICE ENSURING AUTHENTICATION OF THE SEISMIC DATA; A JOINTLY DEVELOPED OR OTHER DEVICE AGREED UPON BY THE SIDES MIGHT BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE SIDES SHALL WORK OUT AGREED PROCEDURES FOR INSTALLING AND MAINTAINING SUCH A MONITORING DEVICE. THE SIDES SHALL USE AGREED EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY FOR PURPOSES OF VERIFYING TREATY COMPLIANCE. THE SIDES SHALL USE AGREED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS FOR THE EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE THA THE OPERATION OF THE DESIGNATED NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT EXCLUSIVELY BY NATIONAL PERSONNEL.

THE AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THAT THE WORKING OUT OF SPECIFIC MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIED PROVISIONS SHOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WHICH WOULD BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT.

WE HAVE SET FORTH TODAY AN ANALYSIS OF THE US PROPOSAL ON INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS IN SUCH DETAIL BECAUSE THE

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WAY IN WHICH THE ISSUE OF INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS IS FORMULATED, IN OUR OPINION, IS NOW BECOMING ONE OF THE BASIC FACTORS DEFINING FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ONE WOULD LIKE TO HOPE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL DEMONSTRATE A REASONABLE APPROACH HERE,CORRESPONDING TO THE TASK OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF A COMPLETE AND GENERAL BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS. END TEXT. WARNKE

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